Resolution 2254; Between the Dream of the Revolutionaries and the Truth of Reality
Opinion articles: by Osama Aghi
Analyst of the NEDAA POST portal 7/07/2022
The political arena of the forces of the revolution and the opposition is witnessing various debates about Resolution 2254. These debates do not take place through a careful reading of the outcome of the balance of power between the Assad regime and its ally on the one hand, and between the military and political forces of the revolution and its alliance on the other hand. A careful reading of a political event or a military action requires staying away from the hidden desires that burn in ourselves and control our vision of this event or action.
Resolution 2254 issued by the UN Security Council on the eighteenth of December 2015, was not a decision far from the real reality of the conflict between the Assad regime and its Russian, Iranian and militia allies, and between the forces of the Syrian revolution with its military factions and political and media forces on the other hand, the conflict at the time was inclined to favor the regime after the Russian military intervention in it, and this weakened the forces of the revolution in the field, and made the international forces try to formulate a decision related to this conflict and to stop it.
Since its adoption, the resolution has carried with it the concept of a political settlement, this settlement, contained in the phrase (reaffirms its support for the Geneva Communiqué of June 30, 2012, and supports the two Vienna Communiqués in the context of seeking to ensure the full implementation of the Geneva Communiqué, as a basis for a Syrian-led political transition, and in light of a process that the Syrians are in control of in order to end the conflict in Syria, and stresses that the Syrian people will decide the future of Syria.)
This means that the crisis will continue for many years, because any implementation of this decision requires the approval and agreement of the two parties to the conflict (the Assad regime and the forces of the revolution).
Pushing for Resolution 2254 requires pressure on the United Nations and states to persuade them to implement it under Chapter VII, without which this resolution remains subject to procrastination and circumvention, which complicates the Syrian conflict and keeps it as a focus of conflicts that spread from it to neighboring countries and the region, which threatens international stability and peace.
International Resolution 2254 referred the conflict in Syria to a settlement platform, and this means that there is no military victory for either party, and it means a political change in the structure of governance and the state. This change is led by the Syrians, who are the forces of the revolution and the opposition on the one hand, and the Assad regime on the other.
The essence of this speech means a political partnership between a party representing the Assad regime and the forces of the revolution and the opposition, on the basis of a political transition guaranteed by the Geneva Declaration 1, the Vienna Declaration, and Resolutions 2118 and 2254.
Considering that the political transition is not only a change in the personalities of the government, but also by changing the mechanisms of governance and the structure of the state, this means dismantling tyranny through the auspices of the United Nations, whose resolution stipulates the holding of transparent elections in which all Syrians inside and outside the country participate, and which are fully supervised by the United Nations – to prevent any fraud or tampering with its results.
The elections will not take place before agreeing on a new constitution in the country. This constitution should not allow the concentration of the highest powers in the state in the hands of a party or an individual, and that there should be state institutions that are independent, and each of them possesses the authority entrusted to it, in accordance with its tasks stipulated in the constitution.
Returning to the reality of the current situation in the structures of the opposition and the revolution, and in the structures of the regime, they are no longer the main players in the equation of the conflict and this is a fact, and the proof of it is simple and clear. The forces of the revolution, that is, coordination, revolutionary currents and parties, all of these are unable to build a national framework that unites them. Each group of them believes that it possesses most of the truth, and this is a great disaster, which means that they are weak and scattered, and in this case they cannot change the balance of power for their own benefit, especially since the project of the Syrian revolution, as it was adopted after the peaceful retreat of the revolution, is no longer able to accomplish any change.
Let’s look at the structure of the Syrian situation in a more realistic way. The current Syria is divided into de facto authorities, which are the following:
First, the authority of the regime, its Russian and Iranian partners, and the sectarian militias coming from behind the borders, this authority is in a state of ebb and flow, as a result of the overlapping interests of its parties, and the possibility of these interests contradicting, and turning the contradiction into a conflict.
Second, the authority of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which lays its hands on the Idlib regions, some of the countryside of Lattakia and some villages in Aleppo. This authority is characterized by its district religious stances, especially since it is organizationally descended from Al-Qaeda, which is internationally classified as a terrorist organization.
Third, the authority of the liberated North, which includes the areas of operations of the Euphrates Shield, the Olive Branch, and the Peace Spring. This area is actually under the authority of the Interim Government, which is affiliated with the National Coalition, and in it are the military revolution factions supported by the Turkish government.
Fourth, the authority of the northeastern region of Syria, which is governed by the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces, which consists of Kurdish protection forces governed by the cadres of the Kurdistan Workers Party, classified as an armed terrorist party. These forces govern three governorates, Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and Hasaka, with overt American assistance.
Negotiating with the Assad regime on the implementation of Resolution 2254 requires negotiating power cards to be placed on the table, and it needs an amendment by the Security Council to the wording of this resolution, allowing the negotiation to be scheduled for a time and the implementation of its essence as it should.
If we wanted to know the papers of the negotiating power of the revolutionary forces, what would we find? Frankly, we will find that the military decision of the revolutionary factions affiliated with the Ministry of Defense of the Interim Government is not in the hands of these factions. Therefore, they cannot develop and implement military operations to pressure the regime in negotiations, because the decision to war is not their decision, and it is linked to the regional powers involved in the conflict in Syria.
We find the same thing with the Assad militias, as the military decision is not in their hands, and it is subject to regional and international understandings and arrangements, and this situation applies to the two de facto authority areas of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces.
The case as it is, no Syrian party has the right to change it, and this prolongs the suffering of displaced Syrians and refugees in neighboring countries or where they reside. Also, it is not in the interest of the Assad regime to accept writing a new constitution under the auspices of the United Nations. If this constitution is implemented, it will strip the regime of its previous ability to control the country, its army and security forces, this matter is realized by the opposition negotiating body, so it insists on implementing UN Resolution 2254 by negotiating its four baskets.
The Negotiating Committee cannot perform miracles outside the existing balance of power in the Syrian equation regionally and internationally. Therefore, revolutionaries should not be too “short-sighted” to deal with the ability and potential of the Negotiating Committee. Like it or not, this regime is compelled by international pressure, and by its Russian ally, and its deteriorating situation, to go to Geneva to negotiate with the delegation of the forces of the revolution and the opposition.
This existing equation requires the forces of the revolution and the opposition to reproduce their position based on the reality of their situation. This reality requires acceptance of a political settlement with the Assad regime, that secures a political transition and a change in the structure of the ruling system in the country, without revolutionary dreams that have no place in reality.
Producing the position of the forces of the revolution and the opposition requires more building bridges and relations with its popular and revolutionary incubators without revolutionary illusions and exaggerations, and requires transparency in discourse and practice, which creates trust in it.
The Syrians who reject the Assad regime’s tyranny are invited to see this reality. Without doing so, they will only increase their suffering and worsen their situation, especially since the global conflict between the international powers in Ukraine will further complicate the political solution in Syria, as long as that conflict continues.
Will the Syrians turn to realism to reproduce Syria anew without tyranny, geographical fragmentation, or disunity among the national components?
It is the fixed reality that imposes its law in the end, and whoever ignores this will undoubtedly find himself outside history.